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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH A. DESCHLER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
FIREMAN'S FUND AMERICAN LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18035 
This is an action for recovery of insurance benefits 
under an accidental death policy that excludes coverage for 
death resulting from the use of a device for aerial naviga-
tion. The parties will be designated as they appeared below. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the lower court 
granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff-beneficiary hold-
ing as a matter of law that the insured, who fell to his 
death while flying in a kite being pulled by a motorboat, was 
not using a "device for aerial navigation." Judgment was 
entered in plaintiff's favor on September 23, 1981. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Fireman's Fund American Life Insurance Company seeks a 
reversal of the judgment of the lower court and entry of 
judgment, as a matter of law, in its favor. 
QUESTION ON APPEAL 
Whether a kite designed and used as a recreational vehi-
cle for controlled travel above the surface of water is a 
device for aerial navigation, within the meaning of an acci-
dental death insurance policy exclusion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Elizabeth A. Deschler is the widow of Robert W. 
Deschler who died on July 26, 1980, from injuries suffered 
when he fell with a kite at Starvation Reservoir, Utah. Mr. 
Deschler was flying the 17-foot wingspan kite at a height of 
approximately forty to fifty feet above the surface of the 
water when the towrope connecting the kite to a motorboat 
disengaged. A gust of wind then carried the kite toward the 
beach. Mr. Deschler fell to the ground, causing the injuries 
which resulted in his death. [R. 17-18]. 
At the time of the accident, Mr. Deschler was insured 
under a group accidental death policy written by defendant 
Fireman's Fund American Life Insurance Company and issued to 
the Utah State Employees Credit Union, Master Policy Number 
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DVA 525-131. Plaintiff is the named beneficiary under the 
Accidental Death and Dismemberment Coverage of said policy. 
The policy provides benefits in the event of accidental death 
of the insured, subject to the following exclusion: 
EXCLUSIONS 
The policy does not cover any loss, fatal or non-
fatal, caused by or resulting from (1) injuries 
sustained in consequence of riding as a passenger 
or otherwise in any vehicle or device for aerial 
navigation, ••• 
The sole issue presented to the lower court was whether 
the exclusion from coverage of any loss resulting from the 
use of a vehicle or device for aerial navigation bars the 
plaintiff's claim to the proceeds. [R. 23-30; 41-50]. 
The parties submitted affidavits from the manufacturer of 
the kite and experienced users of the device which are in 
substantial agreement as to the design, use and operation of 
the kite. [R. 31-33; 51-52; 54-55; 56-57]. The kite at 
issue in this case was constructed of aircraft aluminum and 
dacron sail cloth. It weighed 40 lbs. and had a wingspan of 
17 feet. The operator sits in a seat made of seat-belt web-
bing equipped with a safety belt. The seat itself is attach-
ed to a control bar which is used to navigate the kite. [R. 
32] • 
The kite and operator are lifted airbo~ne behind a motor-
boat and are kept aloft by the airfoil design of the kite 
-3-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which creates lift and retards downward motion. [R. 32]. 
While in flight, the operator controls and navigates the 
craft by pushing the control bar to the left or right to con-
trol lateral direction, or up and down to control the ascent 
or descent. [R. 33, 54, 56]. While being towed, the opera-
tor is not randomly drifting or descending through the air, 
but may fly in any direction he chooses to navigate, up or 
down, right or left and, to some extent, the operator may 
even control the speed of the craft. [R. 33, 54, 56]. The 
boat which tows the kite with a 250-300 foot rope simply dic-
tates the general course of travel. [R. 33]. To terminate 
the flight, the operator releases the tow-rope and navigates 
to a landing spot on the water near the shoreline. [R. 33]. 
Mr. Deschler was an avid and proficient user of the craft 
and had gone "kiting" virtually every weekend for years prior 
to his death. [R. 51]. 
Flying the kite obviously carried an attendant risk of 
death or serious injury. [R. 52]. Like a hang-glider, the 
kite could stall on too steep a turn or maneuver. [R. 54-55; 
56-57]. While airborne, the kite was also subject to wind 
gusts and air currents that can cause the operator to lose 
control and descend too rapidly. [R. 55; 56-57]. While air-
borne, Mr. Deschler encountered such a wind gust that caused 
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the craft to crash to the ground from a height of at least 
40-50 feet. [R. 17]. 
On the basis of the affidavits, Answers to Interroga-
tories, photographs of the kite in flight, and stipulated 
terms of the insurance policy, both parties filed motions for 
summary judgment. The lower court granted plaintiff's motion 
and denied defendant's motion without discussion, impliedly 
holding that the kite the deceased was flying at the time of 
his death was not a device for aerial navigation. [R. 90-91]. 
ARGUMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, ROBERT W. DESCHLER'S 
DEATH WAS THE RESULT AN AN "INJURY SUS-
TAINED IN CONSEQUENCE OF RIDING AS A PAS-
SENGER OR OTHERWISE IN A VEHICLE OR DEVICE 
FOR AERIAL NAVIGATION," AN EXCLUDED RISK 
UNDER THE INSURANCE CONTRACT. 
The question of what constitutes a "vehicle or device for 
aerial navigation", within the meaning of an accidental death 
policy exclusion, is a matter of first impression in this 
jurisdiction. Other courts, however, under virtually identi-
cal circumstances have uniformly held that recreational use 
of any kite or glider-like device which travels by air is a 
hazardous activity intended to be covered by the exclusion. 
In construing contracts of insurance, including coverage 
exclusions, normal rules of construction apply. Words are to 
be give their usual and ordinary accepted meaning and, unless 
there is some ambiguity or uncertainty ih the language, the 
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policy is to be enforced according to its terms. St. Paul 
Fire and Marine Insurance v. Commercial Union Assurance, 606 
P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 1980); Bergera v. Ideal National Life 
Insurance Company, 524 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 1974). 
The conclusion the courts have reached in prior cases is 
not only supported by the ordinarily accepted meaning of the 
policy language, but also by the clear logic of applying the 
exclusion, as it was intended, to conduct that experience has 
shown to be hazardous to life and limb. 
In a case strikingly similar to the present action the 
Georgia Court of Appeals in Fireman's Fund American Life 
Insurance Company v•·Long, 251 S.E.2d 133 (Ga.App. 1978) 
reversed a summary judgment for the beneficiary under an ac-
cidental death policy and directed that judgment be entered 
for the defendant insurer. In that case the decedent had 
died while operating a "hang-glider" designed to be towed 
behind a motor vehicle. Decedent hooked one end of the tow-
rope to the bumper of a van and the other to the hand-release 
control of his glider. The van pulled out and decedent, 
while seated in a swing-like harness, ran with the kite until 
airborne. Upon reaching an altitude of 100 feet, the tow-
rope disengaged, either accidentally or by means of the hand-
release control, and the decedent nose-dived to the ground; 
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the fall resulting in the injuries from which he died several 
hours later. 
The beneficiary under an accidental death policy insuring 
the deceased brought suit to recover policy benefits. The 
defendant insurer moved for summary judgment on the basis of 
a policy provision excluding coverage for "loss caused by or 
resulting from ••• [t]ravel or flight in any vehicle or 
device for aerial navigation •••• " Id. at 134. The trial 
court denied defendant's motion and granted a cross-motion 
for summary judgment in favor of the beneficiary. The defen-
dant appealed. 
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the 
hang-glider was indeed a "vehicle or device for aerial navi-
gation" within the policy exclusion. The court stated: 
Appellant contends that the glider constitutes a 
"vehicle or device for aerial navigation" within the 
purview of the policy's aviation exclusion. We 
agree with this contention. Navigation is defined 
as "the science or art of conducting ships or air-
craft from one place to another." Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary, (1966), p. 1509. 
251 S.E.2d at 134. The appeals court found that the hang-
glider qualified as an "aircraft" and the policy exclusion 
was applicable. The court therefore entered judgment in 
favor of the insurance company. Accord Fielder v. Farmer's 
New World Life Insurance Company, 435 F.Supp. 912 (C.D. Cal. 
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1977) [operation of hang-glider falls within excluded risk of 
"travel or flight in an aircraft."] 
In Wilson v~ Insurance Company of North America, 453 
F.Supp. 732 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the Federal Court for the 
Northern District of California, upon cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, granted summary judgment in favor of the in-
surer in an action to recover accidental death benefits. In 
that case the court was asked to decide whether operation of 
a "hang-kite" constituted "travel or flight in any vehicle or 
device for aerial navigation", as those terms were used in an 
exclusion clause in a group accidental death policy. 
The undisputed facts established that the operator of the 
"hang-kite" controls the direction of the flight by use of a 
control bar. By shifting his weight on the bar he can turn 
the vehicle to the right or left, and ascend or descend. In 
contrast to a glider which is designed like a wing, the 
"hang-kite" is structurally patterned after a parachute. Id. 
at 733. 
The plaintiff sought to capitalize on this structural 
distinction between the devices, arguing that since the 
"hang-kite" is patterned after a parachute, it is not an 
"aircraft" and therefore not navigable, since the term "navi-
gation" means "piloting an aircraft." 
-8-
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The court rejected plaintiff's argument and granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant insurer emphasizing the logic 
of applying the exclusion to this type of activity: 
[I]n the instant case, the inquiry concerns not only 
the status of a hang-kite as an "aircraft", but also 
the act of operating it as "piloting" an aircraft. 
For this reason, the designer of decedent's hang-
kite could swear in two separate statements given to 
plaintiff and defendant, respectfully, without con-
tradicting himself that the hang-kite he designed 
for decedent was patterned after a parachute and 
that the means of control was such that the decedent 
could and did navigate his craft. Construing the 
exclusionary language in the brochure in its en-
tirety rather than by its divisible parts, it is 
clear that the insured would reasonably expect that 
the operation of a hang-kite would constitute just 
the type of activity that the policy was not in-
tended to cover. Defendant, Insurance Company of 
North American, has, therefore, met its burden of 
showing that the terms of its policy conform to the 
reasonable expectation of the insured, and, accord-
ingly, is entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
of law. 
453 F.Supp. at 735. 
The most recent case dealing with a kite-like device and 
an "aerial navigation" exclusion is Cabell v. World Service 
Life Insurance Company, 599 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) 
where the Civil Court of Appeals for Texas affirmed a judg-
ment for the insurer in a declaratory action upon a group 
life insurance policy. 
The insured in Cabell died when the "para-plane" he was 
operating stalled in mid-air and nose-dived to the ground. 
The beneficiary made demand on the insurer for payment of 
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benefits whereupon the insurance company instituted a declar-
atory judgment action to determine its liability. 
The "para-plane" device at issue in Cabell was controlled 
by the operator by means of "steering toggles." Like a kite 
or glider, the "para-plane" was highly and used the aero-
dynamic principles of an airfoil to allow the operator to fly 
in the direction he chooses. Although patterned after a 
parachute, the wing-type para-plane is used for sport jump-
ing, unlike the conventional parachute used primarily for 
emergency exits from aircraft. Id. at 652. 
Trial was to the court, without a jury. The insurer con-
tended that the death was an excluded risk since it resulted 
from an injury sustained while "riding as a passenger or 
otherwise in any vehicle or device for aerial navigation," a 
specific coverage exclusion. The trial court agreed and 
entered judgment for the insurer. 
On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals for Texas affirm-
ed. In doing so it brushed aside the appellant-beneficiary's 
proferred technical definitions of "aerial navigation," 
choosing instead to the follow the more common and ordinary 
definitions of those terms. The court stated: 
For example, appellant's own cited authority, Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary (un-
abridged), gives these definitions as preferred to 
those suggested by appellant: 
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"Aerial - of, or belonging to the air or atmos-
phere." 
"To navigate - to direct one's course through 
any medium; specifically to operate an airplane 
or airship." 
By these definitions, aerial navigation would simply 
mean to direct one's course through the air. we 
believe such a definition would be closer to the 
commonly understood and accepted meaning of the term 
aerial navigation than the narrow ones suggested by 
appellant. Moreover, that general interpretation 
has received the sanction of the courts. In Smith 
v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association, 
supra, the Supreme Court of Kansas defined "partici-
pating in aeronautics or air travel" as "to share in 
sailing or floating in the air." The chute in ques-
tion here more than meets the test of that def ini-
tion. It did not merely float or drift uncontroll-
ably through the air, but was maneuverable to the 
extent that its direction, speed and rate of descent 
could be controlled with a considerble degree of 
accuracy. The fact that it had no power, except for 
the air, or that it could not travel upward or hori-
zontally for great distances, is not significant. 
It could be maneuvered or directed through the air, 
and we think that the insurance policy and the in-
sured must have contemplated that any device capable 
of doing that was a device for aerial navigation. 
599 S.W.2d at 654. 
In a final attempt to find coverage, appellant argued 
that if the policy intended to exclude accidents involving 
para-planes it should have explicitly done so; the language 
of the policy exclusion is therefore ambiguous and must be 
construed against the drafter. 
The appeals court rejected this argument as well, stating: 
Of course, the policy could have specifically named 
every known or conceivable type of device for aerial 
navigation had the company chosen to do so, but such 
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specificity is not necessary when the general term, 
by its common and ordinary meaning, clearly includes 
the device in question. 
599 S.W.2d at 654. 
The foregoing discussion contains all reported cases 
dealing with kite or glider devices in the context of an 
insurance policy "aerial navigation" exclusion. The cases 
uniformly hold that such vehicles are devices for aerial 
navigation. 
Several courts have examined the analogous question of 
whether a parachute is a "device for aerial navigation" for 
purposes of an insurance policy exclusion. While these cases 
are factually distinguishable (based on the nature and oper-
ation of a parachute vis-a-vis a kite or glider), they pro-
vide additional authority and analytical assistance for de-
fendant's position in this case. 
The most recent case dealing with a parachute and an 
"aerial navigation" exclusion is Edison v. Reliable Life 
Insurance Company, 495 F.Supp. 484 (W.D. Wash. 1980). In 
that case the plaintiff-beneficiary brought suit against the 
defendant insurer to recover policy benefits for the death of 
the insured who lost his life when his parachute failed to 
open during a sport parachuting event. The insured denied 
coverage and moved for summary judgment on the ground that 
the insured's cause of death was a result of his riding in a 
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"device for aerial navigation," an excluded risk under the 
policy. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, 
arguing that since the exclusion did not mention sport para-
chutes specifically the language of the exclusion is ambig-
uous and should be interpreted in favor of the insured. 
The court granted the defendant-insurer's motion for sum-
mary judgment stating: 
In my view, any parachute is "a device for 
aerial navigation." Webster defines "navigation" as 
"the act or practice of navigating." "Navigate" is 
defined as "to travel by ship." "Aerial navigation" 
therefore means "to travel by air." A parachute is 
clearly a device in which to travel by air. 
495 F.Supp. at 496. 
As further support for its position, the court made an 
important distinction based upon the purpose for which the 
device was being used at the time of the accident, a distinc-
tion equally applicable to the case at bar. 
There has been some discussion as to the dis-
tinction between parachutes as "safety devices" and 
parachutes for "sporting purposes." In my view the 
distinction lies not in the design or construction 
of the parachute, but rather the purposes for which 
it is used. If a person riding as a passenger in a 
certified aircraft is forced to use a parachute to 
save himself from disaster because of some crisis 
which affects him as a passenger, he might well be 
covered by the policy until he safely reaches the 
ground. But one who is riding as a passenger in a 
certified aircraft loses his status as such when he 
voluntarily leaves the plane, choosing an alternate 
means of returning to earth. In the former illus-
tration, if the parachute fails to open, the insured 
dies as a consequence of having been riding as a 
passenger in a certified aircraft. In the later 
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illustration, if the parachute fails to open, the 
insured dies as a consequence of riding in a device 
for aerial navigation which has been specifically 
excluded from the policy. 
There has also been much discussion about the 
maneuverability of various types of parachutes. 
Such discussion, in my view, is irrelevant since all 
parachutes are maneuverable to some degree. In any 
event, no such distinctions are relevant here since 
the device, a parachute package, in which the in-
sured had chosen to ride and was riding at the time 
of his death was neither designed nor intended as a 
safety device, but was designed and intended to be 
maneuverable. 
495 F.Supp at 486-87 [footnotes omitted]. 
Other courts have reached the same holding in parachute 
cases. See ~' Smith v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident 
Association, 258 P.2d 993 (Kan. 1953) ["participating in 
aeronautics", as used in insurance policy exclusion, means to 
"share in sailing or floating in air" and includes sport 
parachuting.] Contra Childress v. Continental Casualty Com-
~, 461 F.Supp. 704 (E.D. La. 1978) [sport parachute is not 
"device for aerial navigation."] 
Childress v. Continental Casualty Company, supra, is the 
only recent case holding that a parachute is not a "device 
for aerial navigation" within the meaning of an insurance 
policy exclusion. The Childress opinion was criticized by 
the federal district court in Edison v. Reliable Life Insur-
ance Company, 495 F.Supp. 484, 487 (W.D. Wash. 1980) [dis-
cussed on prior page], and offers little assistance to the 
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court in deciding the case at bar. In Childress, the court 
properly reasoned that since the policy did not define "de-
vice for aerial navigation," the court must look to common 
and ordinary definitions. Inexplicably, the court then 
analyzed the common definition of "parachute" rather than the 
policy terms "aerial navigation." The court then stated, 
without offering any supporting reasoning, that a parachute 
is not a "device for aerial navigation." 
CONCLUSION 
By common dictionary definition, the terms "aerial navi-
gation" mean "to direct one's course through the air." Each 
and every court which has considered the question of whether 
a kite or glider device is a "device for aerial navigation", 
within the meaning of an insurance policy exclusion, has held 
that it is. With limited exception, analogous authority 
dealing with parachutes is in accord. 
Logic and reason compel a similar conclusion in this 
case. Mr. Deschler was not forced to use the kite he was 
piloting at the time of the accident; the kite was not an 
emergency device, but was purposefully used for recreational 
enjoyment. Mr. Deschler, as an experienced operator, did not 
simply drift through the air while piloting the kite, but was 
able to choose his course of travel. He could navigate in 
whichever direction he chose, up or down, right or left, and 
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could even control his rate of speed to some extent. Mr. 
Deschler was clearly able to travel or direct his course 
through the air in the same manner as the insureds in the 
cases discussed above. 
The hazardous nature of this type of activity and its 
attendant risk of loss of life or limb is well-known. The 
exclusion at issue in this case is a modification of earlier 
aviation exclusions and is clearly targeted to deal with the 
new risks created by the spreading popularity of sport 
kiting, gliding and parachuting. Applying the usual and 
ordinary accepted meaning to the policy language, it is 
unequivocally clear that the exclusion was contemplated and 
designed to avoid the specific risk to which the deceased 
exposed himself when he left the surface of the water to 
travel by air behind the motor boat. 
The judgment of the lower court, if affirmed, would make 
Utah a minority of one on this seemingly clear issue. The 
better reasoned, if not compelling, view is that devices of 
the type used by Robert Deschler are devices for "aerial 
navigation" and, no factual dispute remaining, the judgment 
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of the lower court should be reversed and judgment entered 
for defendant as a matter of law. 
Dated this ;3t!: day of January, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
ByE~~ 
Bruce H. Jensen 
Attorneys for Fireman's Fund 
American Life Insurance 
Company 
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